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the relationships among employee representation, formal union sta-
tus, and employer strategies within and across institutional regimes 
offer a variegated landscape in the context of globalization. Key ques-
tions remain as to the relative weight of macro- and micro-level influ-
ences on union status at subsidiaries of multinational companies 
(MNCs). this study analyzes data gathered through coordinated sur-
veys of MNC subsidiaries in Canada, Ireland, and the United King-
dom, and tests the extent to which union status and double-breasting 
depend on home-country variation, host-country influences, and 
particular organizational characteristics. the authors find support for 
a combination of effects on both union status and double-breasting. 
further analyses test explicit variations on union status within each 
host context and support arguments that effects depend on the par-
ticularities of national industrial relations regimes.
the relationship between multinational companies (MNCs) and union status across different employee representation regimes has generated 
much interest among employment and industrial relations (IR) scholars. 
Employee representation structures are deeply embedded in the institu-
tional arrangements of political economies. Scholars often view MNCs, how-
ever, as exogenous to national path dependencies; MNCs are arguably 
carriers of practices and understandings forged in other contexts. Equally, 
these practices may also vary by firm characteristics and organizational poli-
cies. this confrontation between the logics of MNCs and different employee 
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representation regimes provides important contrasts, framed in terms of di-
vergent and complementary macro- and micro-level influences on employee 
representation within MNC subsidiaries.
Our study investigates the extent to which formal union status within 
MNC subsidiaries depends on home-country effects (the country from 
which the MNC originates), host-country effects (the environment in which 
the subsidiary operates), and firm-specific differences related to organiza-
tional policy, structure, and subsidiary supply chain integration. we com-
pare these effects and measure their relative influence in subsidiaries across 
in three national settings: Canada, Ireland, and the United Kingdom.
Our analysis seeks to explain two practices: (1) recognition, or certifica-
tion, of unions for purposes of collective representation (union status), and 
(2) double-breasting, or the concurrent operation of union and nonunion 
sites, in foreign subsidiaries. we contribute to the literature by comparing 
how a wide range of factors influence these two dependent variables.
Our use of surveys from these three host countries also enables us to ex-
plore variation among three liberal market economies (LMEs), as identified 
by the varieties of capitalism (VoC) literature (Hall and Soskice 2001). Our 
focus on within-system variation allows us to assess how factors that influ-
ence union status differ across these IR systems. In addition, we examine the 
factors shaping union status within each individual host country.
Defining Union Status and Double-Breasting
Union status and double-breasting can mean different things in different con-
texts. we define union status as “the recognition (or certification) of a trade 
union (or unions) for the purposes of collective bargaining.”1 Admittedly, 
the process by which unions achieve collective bargaining status differs by 
country. In Canada, union certification follows the wagner Act model and 
can be achieved through representation elections or, in some jurisdictions, 
card check, where the majority of potential union members at a worksite 
indicate that they desire a union. while decisions about union certification 
are in principle completely independent of management, in practice em-
ployers invest considerable resources to shape outcomes—either through 
the implementation of union-substitution HRM practices or through direct 
opposition to unionization (Bentham 2002; Campolieti et al. 2007). In Ire-
land and the United Kingdom, the recognition of unions for bargaining 
purposes is largely voluntary. while a statutory procedure was introduced in 
the United Kingdom in 1999, it has been used sparingly (Gall 2007). though 
the decisions to voluntarily recognize a union ultimately rest with manage-
ment, the union organizing effort required to secure formal union status 
1 the terminological distinction between recognition and certification relates to national setting. In 
Canada, we used the term certification, whereas in Ireland and the United Kingdom, we used the term 
recognition. the terms are functionally equivalent across the three countries because they establish com-
parable routes to formal union status for the purposes of collective employee representation.
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plays a critical role, regardless of the mechanics of certification or recogni-
tion procedures in each national setting.
for comparative purposes, two further points about these arrangements 
are important. first, in contrast to economies where union status is largely 
derived from national or industry bargaining arrangements, the variable na-
ture of bargaining in Canada, Ireland, and the United Kingdom offers a 
patchwork of sites where unions may be present or absent. Second, union 
status in MNC subsidiaries is often contested and subject to managerial 
strategies and policies at both the corporate and subsidiary levels, be they 
favorable or hostile to union presence or somewhere in between. this moti-
vates our interest in understanding both macro- and micro-level factors af-
fecting union status in MNC subsidiaries.
the term double-breasting has its origins in the U.S. construction sector 
and the practice of firms operating “in both unionized and non-unionized 
segments of the industry” in order to reduce labor costs and achieve greater 
flexibility in work practices (Lipsky and farber 1976: 401). Double-breasting 
is often characterized as as an employer strategy to suppress unionization, 
whereby nonunion sites are added to existing unionized sites (Gunnigle et 
al. 2009). But it may not always be a union avoidance technique (Beaumont 
and Harris 1992; Cullinane et al. 2012). It may reflect a legacy of site acquisi-
tion or the different organizing proclivities of workforces at various sites. 
for example, it may reflect differences between sites that are exclusively 
white-collar and those where blue-collar workers predominate; or, as in fed-
eral systems with split jurisdictions over industrial relations issues, it may re-
flect within-country variation in labor law. It is clear that sites in MNC 
subsidiaries in the three national settings can be both union and nonunion 
and that, within each setting, union status at particular worksites can often 
be the subject of strategic contention. Our interest, therefore, is to analyze 
how different explanations of MNC behavior contribute to an understand-
ing of the extent to which double-breasting occurs in Canada, Ireland, and 
the United Kingdom.
Literature and Hypotheses
Recent literature highlights how subsidiary managers, caught between con-
flicting pressures exerted by MNC central management and their local envi-
ronments, must try to balance these different demands (Morgan 2011). the 
challenge for researchers is to comprehend the relative influence of these 
different levels of effects on the behavior of subsidiaries. Geppert et al. 
(2003) contrast low- and high-context perspectives within the literature: 
low-context perspectives focus on universal contingencies and structural 
configurations, while high-context perspectives emphasize the institutional 
embeddedness of MNCs. Meardi et al.’s study of MNCs finds “a high degree 
of variety which is not readily attributable to home-country effects, nor to 
the influence of host-country environments,” even in the same economic 
sector, though they also find that “the country of origin is not irrelevant and 
ILR66-3_Journal.indb   697 05/02/2013   11:06:14 AM
698 ILRREVIEw
contingency is not absolute” (2009a: 505–6). Moreover, these factors, which 
reflect different types of integration into the global economy as well as par-
ticular trajectories in home-country institutional arrangements, might vary 
from one political economy to another. In detailing the factors that may in-
fluence union status and double-breasting within MNC subsidiaries, we dis-
tinguish between macro-level environmental effects (related to the firm’s 
home country and the host country’s institutional context) and micro-level 
organizational features (firm-specific organizational, structural, and policy 
variables).
Macro-Level Environmental Effects
Considerable research has examined the influence of national business sys-
tems on MNC practices. the VoC approach suggests that fundamental dif-
ferences exist between the structures and institutions constituting LMEs 
and those of coordinated market economies (CMEs) and that firms tend to 
reflect the influence of these institutions and structures (Hall and Soskice 
2001). Although scholars have debated the strengths and weaknesses of the 
VoC approach (Crouch et al. 2009; Hancke 2009), the importance of mac-
roinfluences on MNC subsidiary practices is well documented (ferner 1997; 
whitley 1999; Almond et al. 2005). we refer to these influences as home, 
host, and institutional duality or hybridization factors.
Home Effects
firms tend to transmit attitudes and behavior forged in their home environ-
ment to their foreign operations (Harzing and Sorge 2003; Almond et al. 
2005). In particular, U.S.-based MNCs aspire to implement business policies 
and practices in their subsidiaries that are consistent with those found in 
the U.S. system rather than to necessarily amend their home-country behav-
ior to conform to the host context (Gunnigle et al. 1997; Edwards and 
ferner 2002).
these findings imply that MNCs based in traditionally antiunion environ-
ments will continue to maintain a negative approach toward unions, regard-
less of the IR system in which their subsidiary operations are found (Almond 
et al. 2005). we therefore anticipate that U.S.-based companies are less 
likely to recognize unions and more likely to have double-breasted subsid-
iaries than those originating from other countries (Hypothesis 1a). Con-
versely, we expect the opposite to be the case among MNCs from CMEs 
(Hypothesis 1b); however, the home-country effects of MNCs from CMEs 
may be more complex (ferner and Varul 2000).
Host Effects
A complementary line of macroinstitutional analysis emphasizes the impor-
tance of host-country influences in the study of MNC practices (Geppert et 
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al. 2003). Since employee representation regimes are deeply embedded in 
national institutional arrangements, it can be difficult for foreign MNCs to 
simply transfer their home-country approaches into different national con-
texts. Rather, some researchers argue that MNC subsidiaries must instead 
adapt their practices to accommodate local contextual circumstances (e.g., 
Schmidtt 2003). these arguments suggest that host economies differ, not 
simply between types of coordination in capitalist economies, as suggested 
by the VoC approach, but also within these types, as evidenced by critical 
differences in the IR regimes and union recognition procedures of predom-
inantly Anglophone LMEs (e.g., freeman et al. 2007). Given these differ-
ences, we expect that union status and double-breasting at MNC subsidiaries 
will vary depending on the institutional context within which the subsidiary 
operates (Hypothesis 2). we will elaborate on these expectations for each of 
the three host contexts.
Hybridization or Dual Institutional Effects
the hybridization or dual institutional approach examines ways that MNCs 
strategically adapt their practices to take advantage of institutional distance 
and abandon practices prevalent in their home countries. there is evidence, 
for instance, of German MNCs opting to operate in environments where 
they are not subjected to codetermination and works councils (e.g., Meardi 
et al. 2009a). whereas MNCs from LMEs may more easily see their home 
practices as a source of competitive advantage and seek to transfer them to 
host environments, MNCs from CMEs with strong representation regimes, 
such as Germany and the Nordic countries, may seek to escape the con-
straints of their home IR regimes in their foreign subsidiaries, especially in 
economies where there are ostensibly fewer constraints. this line of analysis 
suggests that union status at subsidiaries of MNCs originating in CMEs will 
not be uniformly higher, nor will double-breasting be uniformly lower, than 
for U.S. subsidiaries (Hypothesis 3a).
Economic Dominance
A specific strand of the literature on home-country and host-country effects 
emphasizes the role of economic dominance, which “concern[s] the un-
even nature of economic power, and the tendency for one society to take 
the lead in evolving work organization or business practices considered 
more efficient than those operating within other countries” (Smith 2005: 
615). Economic success in the home country and internationally endows 
that country’s management practices with a higher degree of legitimacy. 
Given the dominance of the United States in the world economy, foreign 
subsidiaries of MNCS from any country may be more likely to adopt U.S. 
management styles and practices (Pudelko and Harzing 2007). this effect is 
likely to be stronger for subsidiaries located in relatively permissive IR sys-
tems or in political economies that are heavily dependent on foreign direct 
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investment (fDI) (Geary and Roche 2001); and it has led some host coun-
tries to reshape their IR systems and regulations to offer more scope to 
MNCs (Langille 1981; Hardy 2006; Royle 2006).
these dominance effects may shape host influences within our sample. If 
the United States is providing the dominant economic model for MNC 
practices, we anticipate that the degree of institutional latitude to accom-
modate antiunion practices will be greater where host economies are more 
dependent on U.S. fDI (Hypothesis 3b). we will test this within our host-
country subsets, where we anticipate that U.S. home-country effects on 
union status will be most evident in Ireland.
Micro-Level Organizational Effects
Exclusive focus on macro-level effects can come at the cost of understand-
ing the importance of firm-specific variables for union status and double-
breasting. these include contingency, organizational policy, and production 
network effects.
Contingency
Harzing and Sorge (2003) contrast home-country influences with “universal 
contingencies,” such as sector and size. they find that control mechanisms 
within the MNC tend to reflect home-country patterns but that MNC inter-
nationalization strategies are more likely to be influenced by the sector of its 
activities and the size of the organization. In a study of the varying impact 
on workforces of the deployment of threats to relocate by MNC subsidiaries, 
Meardi et al. (2009b) similarly identify the importance of a range of struc-
tural and contingent factors.
there is considerable evidence that a subsidiary’s sector of activity is likely 
to have a direct impact on union status (Marginson and Sisson 2004). Pro-
duction (manufacturing and resource extraction) tends to be heavily union-
ized. we therefore anticipate that MNCs operating in production activities 
are more likely to have a formal union presence than those in services ac-
tivities (Hypothesis 4).
Given the greater challenge to standardization of processes, a greater de-
gree of product diversity is generally associated with increased complexity 
(tallman and Li 1996) and less centralization (Hill and Hoskisson 1987), as 
well as, potentially, less detailed interest in IR practices (Edwards 2000). Greater 
product heterogeneity is also likely to be associated with increased double-
breasting, simply because employers are likely to use a wider range of employ-
ment arrangements to fit the demands of diverse products (Hypothesis 5).
A final contingent variable, which we treat as a control variable, concerns 
the subsidiary’s size. In addition to a higher degree of union presence, we 
expect that subsidiaries employing more people are more likely to be double-
breasted because multiple sites increase the likelihood of both union and 
nonunion facilities.
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Organizational Policy
the extent of subsidiary discretion in policymaking and execution is one 
expression of the relations linking subsidiaries and higher levels of decision-
making within a MNC. As described by westney and Zaheer (2009: 361), the 
MNC is “a political system as well as an organizational design, with conflicts 
of interest built into its configuration.” Relative autonomy in local decision-
making might be translating not only the effects of organizational policy 
(Sako and Jackson 2006) but also the defense of subsidiary discretion. for 
instance, ferner et al. (2001: 124) emphasize how subsidiary managers can 
mobilize the constraints of the local environment and thereby “win the right 
to interpret and adapt global policies; in short, they may be able to nego-
tiate more freedom of action with respect to the center.” Morgan and 
 Kristensen (2006) have similarly highlighted how the best long-term strat-
egy available to subsidiary managers is not necessarily strict adherence to 
headquarters’ policy dictates because subsidiary managers need to carve out 
space for enhanced autonomy that enables them to better balance the con-
flicting pressures they face.
these findings invite particular attention to the degree to which local 
discretion over the formal recognition of unions shapes union status at 
MNC subsidiaries. we argue that higher levels of local discretion may posi-
tively influence union status (Hypothesis 6). Subsidiary managers tightly 
controlled by headquarters are constrained from responding to asymmetric 
variations in local IR environments. In the three institutional contexts under 
study, engaging with unions was historically the rule rather than the excep-
tion, particularly at larger firms; local managers were familiar with an envi-
ronment that tolerated and accepted a union presence. therefore, if 
subsidiary managers are left with full discretion with regard to unions, we 
expect that they may be more inclined to revert to local customs that pro-
mote union status than managers whose autonomy on the issue is more cir-
cumscribed by headquarters. this may be particularly true among U.S. 
subsidiaries, especially if central management is not accustomed to engag-
ing with unions.2 Alternatively, apparent discretion effects might be domi-
nated by home-country influences and therefore may dissipate when the 
analysis accounts for this factor.
Subsidiary Integration into the MNC
A key feature of MNCs is the extent to which their subsidiaries are inte-
grated into the parent company operations or international production 
2 while any account of discretion must consider evidence that in U.S. firms, managers tend to see 
unions as harmful to their careers (freeman and Rogers 1999) and to believe that union presence is 
likely to be viewed unfavorably by central management (freeman and Kleiner 1990), it is unclear whether 
managers holding these beliefs are also heavily controlled by central management. this may be a logical 
extrapolation of the tendency observed in U.S. MNCs to limit managerial discretion and view unions 
more unfavorably. In such cases, we would again expect that lower levels of local discretion (i.e., more 
centralized control) negatively affect union status at subsidiaries.
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networks. the challenge is to understand the linkages within firms and 
across borders (see Dicken et al. 2001; Lane 2008). for a subsidiary, these 
can be gauged by the extent to which a unit is supplied by (downstream in-
tegration) or supplies to (upstream integration) other sites of the parent 
firm. there is scant research on the effects of production network integra-
tion at MNC subsidiaries on union status. One interpretation is that a sub-
sidiary’s greater cross-border integration with other units of the MNC’s 
production network will increase pressure on cost and flexibility. for exam-
ple, increased competition within and between global regions would pro-
vide an incentive to control labor costs. we anticipate that because of 
increased cost pressures exerted on the subsidiary, production network inte-
gration, particularly upstream, will lower union status and increase double-
breasting (Hypothesis 7).
Exploring Influences on Union Status within Differing Host Contexts
All three countries in our study have comparable levels of union density, 
varying from 27% in Canada and the United Kingdom to 32% in Ireland.3 
All have also experienced a relative decline in density. this decline is greater 
in Ireland (from 54% in 1980 to 32% in 2008) and the United Kingdom 
(from 50% 1979 to 27% by 2008) than in Canada (from 34% in 1980 to 27% 
in 2008), which never reached the levels achieved in Ireland and the United 
Kingdom.
Canada has a heritage of extensive legal regulation that makes it possible 
for a union to be certified as the monopoly bargaining agent of a desig-
nated group of workers (Murray and Verge 1999). while the Canadian 
legal framework is more favorable to unions than that of the United States 
(Godard 2003), the trend toward compulsory certification elections in a 
number of jurisdictions has increased the scope for employer opposition to 
representation (Bentham 2002; Riddell 2004; Campolieti et al. 2007). Eco-
nomic dominance pressures from the United States are evident to a degree 
throughout Canada, where some legal provisions have been tilted in the di-
rection of the U.S. framework. At the same time, the stronger legislative af-
firmation of freedom of association as a fundamental right in Canada and 
the decentralized but robust legal regulation of those rights mitigate some 
of these pressures. Nevertheless, the facts that jurisdiction over IR issues is 
split between different provinces, northern territories, and the federal gov-
ernment and that there is no mechanism for linking union presence be-
tween sites of the same company operating in different jurisdictions 
probably facilitates double-breasting.
In Ireland, there is no mandatory legal process through which unions 
achieve representation at a site. this can be partially traced to provisions in 
the Irish constitution, but it also reflects a public policy stance that seeks to 
avoid mandatory union provisions because of the perceived negative impact 
3 Density figures are taken from OECD records (http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=UN_DEN).
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on Ireland’s capacity to attract fDI, particularly U.S. fDI (Gunnigle et al. 
2005). Ireland’s longstanding policy of attracting mobile fDI in manufac-
turing and internationally traded services appears to have operated under, 
at the least, a tacit understanding of an MNCs’ freedom to establish opera-
tions in a union-free environment, regardless of national partnership ar-
rangements if desired (irrespective of national partnership arrangements).
In the United Kingdom, formal union status remained a voluntary pro-
cess until the enactment of a statutory recognition procedure in 1999 that, 
although its impact has been modest, has impinged on the principle of vol-
untarism. while the number of new bargaining agreements has increased 
since then, the numbers of agreements involved and workers covered are 
not large. Moreover, fewer than 20% of these new agreements have been 
concluded under the statutory procedure (Gall 2007, 2010). the marked 
shift in public policy since the first thatcher-led Conservative government 
in 1979, including the enactment of antiunion legislation, precipitated the 
steep decline in union density (freeman and Pelletier 1990; Disney et al. 
1995) and affected employer preferences regarding union recognition. the 
proportion of new private sector workplaces with unions fell from around 
50% for those established between 1970 and 1980 to 16% between 1994 and 
2004 (Blanchflower and Bryson 2009).
this leads to three country-specific propositions, which we test using 
host-country subsets. first, the dependence of the Irish economy on U.S. 
fDI is likely to translate into a strong home-country effect on union status. 
More specifically, we expect that U.S. MNC practices of union avoidance 
and double-breasting are more likely to be significant in Ireland than in the 
other two countries (Proposition 1). Second, given its integration into the 
North American free trade zone and its reliance on the United States as its 
predominant trading partner, Canada is also more likely than the United 
Kingdom to exhibit dominance effects in this regard (Proposition 2). the 
effect of Canada’s legal procedures is, however, likely to provide greater pro-
tection for union organization than the more voluntary arrangements pre-
vailing in the other two countries (Proposition 3).
Methodology and Models
to test our hypotheses and propositions, we analyze a sample of 633 survey 
responses from foreign-owned subsidiaries in Canada,4 Ireland, and the 
United Kingdom (after listwise deletion of missing data, our effective sample 
is 522 subsidiaries).5 In gathering information from the most senior man-
ager responsible for HR and employment relations practices in the multiple 
sites of MNC subsidiaries in each of the three employment representation 
4 Note that 80% of the Canadian cases report employees in multiple jurisdictions.
5 for national data collection methods, see Bélanger et al. (2006), Edwards et al. (2007), and Lavelle 
et al. (2009). while the smaller number of MNCs in the Canadian data set makes it more sensitive to the 
listwise deletion of missing cases than the data sets for Ireland or the United Kingdom, this appropriate 
treatment of missing data does not bias the independent variables in each country.
ILR66-3_Journal.indb   703 05/02/2013   11:06:14 AM
704 ILRREVIEw
regimes, our survey is uniquely placed to capture both institutional (macro) 
and organizational (micro) factors shaping union status and double-breasting 
practices. we analyze the data in relation to two dichotomous dependent 
variables. the first model measures determinants of union status at all sur-
veyed MNCs (n = 522). firms are given a value of 0 if they do not formally 
recognize unions for the purposes of collective bargaining at any site and a 
1 if they formally recognize unions. the second model analyzes factors that 
influence double-breasting and includes only those MNCs that (a) have at 
least some union presence and (b) operate more than one site in the host 
country (n = 207). In other words, we exclude nonunion firms and single-
site firms. firms that are double-breasted receive a 1, and firms that are not 
receive a 0.
we employ a common set of independent variables across both models.6 
we categorize home country as United States, france, Germany, the United 
Kingdom (but operating in Ireland or Canada only), Japan, the Nordic re-
gion, Other European countries, or the Rest of the world.7 we divide the 
host-country variable into Canada, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. for 
our structure/contingencies variables, we include sector and size. for sec-
tor, we distinguish between services and production. for size, we use three 
ranges: 100–499, 500–999, or 1,000+ employees in the subsidiary operations. 
we also compare the extent to which the provision of goods or services by 
the subsidiary is dominated by a single product or service that accounts for 
90% or more of sales, a dominant product that accounts for 70% to 90% of 
sales, or a range of products where no product or service accounts for more 
than 70% of sales. for our organizational policy variable, we compare sub-
sidiaries that report full discretion over union recognition with those that 
report some or no discretion. finally, we capture two dimensions of subsid-
iary integration into the parent company: downstream, or the extent to 
which its inputs are supplied by other units within the company, and up-
stream, or the extent to which it exports to other units within the company.
we exclude responses from home-based firms for two reasons. first, be-
cause a key element of our model involves comparing the transfer of 
 employment practices between different institutional contexts—from an 
MNC’s country of origin into the different institutional contexts of its sub-
sidiaries—we focus only on foreign subsidiaries. Second, the measurement 
of discretion is problematic for home-based firms. In our study, the senior 
HR manager in the subsidiary was asked to evaluate his or her discretion 
relative to managers at higher levels within the MNC. while the distinction 
is typically clear in operations at foreign subsidiaries, it can be quite 
6 to establish that each variable included in the models is independent of the other variables, we em-
ploy condition indices, tolerance/VIf tests, and a standard correlation matrix (see table 5). full results 
are available on request.
7 In this article, we treat the United States singularly in the home-country classification rather than use 
the regional classification of North America because of this article's emphasis on the United States as a 
unique institutional environment and our specific focus on Canada as a host context.
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ambiguous and, in smaller MNCs, even nonexistent in an MNC’s home-
country operations.
table 1 provides the coding schemes for all variables and the weighted 
results of crosstabs between each of the independent variables and the 
two dependent variables. the results provide several interesting descriptive 
Table 1. Variable Names, Coding Schemes, and weighted Percentages 
for Union Status and Double-Breasting
Variable Name Coding Scheme
Percentage
Union 
Status‡
Percentage
Double-
Breasting‡
DEPENDENt
Union Status Binary dummy 52.2§ —
Double-Breasting Binary dummy† — 54.0§
INDEPENDENt
Host Country
Canada Categorical 62.2 67.5
Ireland Categorical 56.4 47.2
United Kingdom Categorical (reference) 45.3 52.8
Home Country
United States Categorical (reference) 46.3 68.5
france Categorical 50.0 43.8
Germany Categorical 63.2 25.0
United Kingdom Categorical 77.5 37.0
Japan Categorical 48.1 75.0
Nordic Region Categorical 67.9 60.0
Other European Categorical 55.6 30.4
Rest of world Categorical 38.5 50.0
Subsidiary Sector
Services Binary dummy (reference) 34.9 54.8
Production Binary dummy 66.3 53.5
Subsidiary Size
100–499 Categorical (reference) 46.0 43.6
500–999 Categorical 50.6 50.0
1,000–plus Categorical 64.2 62.5
Product Diversification
A single product Categorical 52.7 40.0
One dominant product Categorical 58.8 52.0
A variety of products Categorical (reference) 49.8 58.5
Organizational Policy
Less than full discretion over union status Binary dummy (reference) 43.6 60.0
full discretion over union status Binary dummy 58.7 50.0
Upstream Subsidiary Integration
firm does not supply to other sites Binary dummy (reference) 52.7 40.7
firm supplies to other sites Binary dummy 51.9 63.0
Downstream Subsidiary Integration
firm not supplied by other sites Binary dummy (reference) 47.4 54.3
firm supplied by other sites Binary dummy 53.8 53.9
Notes: Nonweighted percentages are similar to the weighted values; these are available on request.
†this variable includes only firms that identify as having some union presence, and also operate two or 
more sites.
‡Represents the percentage of firms answering yes when asked questions on union status and double-
breasting. for example, 46.3 under U.S. home country indicates that union status was found at 46.3% of 
U.S. firms.
§these values indicate the overall percentages for union status and double-breasting at firms across the 
full sample.
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findings. formal union status exists at 45.3% of MNC subsidiaries in the 
United Kingdom, 56.4% of Irish subsidiaries, and 62.2% of those in Canada. 
these findings suggest relatively large differences among the three host en-
vironments. Double-breasting occurred least often among subsidiaries oper-
ating in Ireland (47.2%) and most often among those based in Canada 
(67.5%); the United Kingdom fell slightly above Ireland (52.8%).
In terms of home-country effects, 46.3% of U.S.-based firms engaged with 
unions. this constituted the second-lowest percentage, behind only the Rest 
of world category. Union status was most likely to exist among firms from 
the United Kingdom (77.5%), followed by those from the Nordic region 
(67.9%), Germany (63.2%), and Other European countries (55.6%); only 
half of french MNCs formally engaged with unions. More than two-thirds of 
U.S. firms were double-breasted. Japanese firms were in fact most likely to 
be double-breasted (75.0%), and those from the Nordic region (60%) were, 
perhaps surprisingly, third most likely. German subsidiaries were double-
breasted least often (25.0%).
we found strong sectoral differences in union status, though not in double-
breasting. the percentage of service firms engaged with unions was roughly 
half that for production. Union status and double-breasting both trended 
upwards with subsidiary size. we found small differences in union status by 
product diversification but no trend regarding double-breasting. In addi-
tion, our results suggest that union status existed more often when subsid-
iaries were granted full discretion. finally, while union status was unaffected 
by subsidiary integration, higher levels of upstream integration appeared to 
correspond with double-breasting.
Logistic Regressions for Full Models
we used logistic regressions to empirically test our models.8 we assigned 
each independent variable a reference category: home country (United 
States), host country (United Kingdom), sector (services), employment size 
(100–499), product diversification (a variety of products produced), discre-
tion over union recognition (less than full), and value chain integration (no 
supply to or from other units within the parent company). we included 
seven hierarchical models that incrementally added blocks of variables, be-
ginning with our host-country variables and adding subsequent blocks for 
home country, sector, size, product diversification, discretion, and value 
chain integration, until our final model was complete.
table 2 documents our regression results for our union status model. 
Host-country location was highly influential on union status and was statisti-
cally significant at every regression increment. In our final model (column 
8 Another option would have been to run linear probability models. to test the robustness of our find-
ings, we ran linear analysis across all models and found similar results. Because of the methodological 
advantages of using logistic methods for binary data, we report the logistic outcomes. Linear results are 
available on request.
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7), we found that operating in the Canadian host context increased a sub-
sidiary’s odds of engaging with unions by a factor of 2.955 when compared 
with the U.K. (p < .01), and the Irish host environment raised odds by a fac-
tor of 1.965 when compared to the United Kingdom (p < .01).9
the MNC’s home country also considerably affected union status. After 
controlling for other factors, German subsidiaries were more likely, by a fac-
tor of 3.055, than U.S. subsidiaries to have unions (p < .05). Also when com-
pared against U.S. MNCs, union status was more likely to exist at U.K. MNCs 
operating in Canada and Ireland (p < .01), Nordic MNCs (p < .10), and Other 
European MNC subsidiaries located in Canada, Ireland, and the United 
Kingdom (p < .10), by factors of 3.797, 2.147, and 1.806, respectively.10 we 
found no difference between french, Japanese, and Rest of world MNCs 
when compared with U.S. MNCs.
we also found a large sector effect on union status. In the final model, 
production firms were more likely by a factor of 5.711 to have unions than 
service firms (p < .01). In addition, we found a size effect, with medium 
(p < .10) and large (p < .01) firms more likely to have unions than small 
firms. Product diversity was significant as well: firms having one dominant 
product were more likely (p < .05) to engage in collective bargaining than 
those with a variety of products. Discretion also proved influential and posi-
tive (p < .01) on union status: the odds of unions having formal status where 
firms granted full discretion over recognition were more than twice those 
where discretion was constrained or absent.11
table 3 provides the results for double-breasting. we found only a small 
host-country effect on double-breasting. In our final model, firms operating 
in Canada were more likely, by a factor of 2.736, to be double-breasted than 
the U.K. reference point (p < .05). we found no difference, however, be-
tween Ireland and the United Kingdom, and the overall explanatory power 
of the host environment on double-breasting was relatively weak.
Unlike the effect of host country, an MNC’s home country was highly in-
fluential. MNCs originating in france (p < .10), Germany (p < .05), the 
United Kingdom (p < .05), and Other European Countries (p < .05) were 
far less likely to be double-breasted than the U.S. reference point. German 
MNCs were the least likely to be double-breasted when compared against 
9 the final host-country results appear to be slightly inflated by suppressor variables. Although both 
Canada and Ireland each differ from the U.K. base, this difference is magnified when organizational 
policy variables are included. the Irish effects also appear to be moderated by home country. these re-
sults are confirmed within the individual host-country regressions.
10 In order to exclude the possibility that home-country effects are a manifestation of industry differ-
ences (in particular, that the concentration of German MNCs in production is the source of a German 
origin effect on union status), we ran interaction terms combining German origin and production sec-
tor. this interaction term did not change the results.
11 In addition to the dichotomous measure of discretion, we ran tests with discretion modeled as a 
continuous variable, from no or a little discretion over union recognition to full discretion, with some and 
quite a lot as intermediate steps, and we categorized, comparing each step against a reference point of full. 
In all cases, results were similar to those reported here. these tests are available on request.
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U.S. MNCs. Home country was the most powerful factor in explaining double-
breasting, as measured by block chi-square differences.
we found sector and size effects in our final model. Production firms 
were considerably less likely (p < .05) to be double-breasted than service 
firms, and the largest firms more likely by a factor of 1.928 (p < .10) to have 
both union and nonunion operations.12 Subsidiaries with a single product 
were less likely (p < .10) to be double-breasted, with an odds ratio of 0.381, 
though the overall influence of product diversification was small. Discretion 
did not influence double-breasting. finally, supply to other sites within the 
parent firm was significant and positive (p < .05) in affecting double-breasting.
Discussion of Full Regression Results
Home-country effects (Hypotheses 1a and 1b) were largely confirmed. 
MNCs originating in Germany, the Nordic region, other (continental) Eu-
ropean countries, as well as the United Kingdom, were substantially more 
likely to have a union presence than those from the United States. the find-
ings support a key argument of this article: within LME host environments, 
U.S. subsidiaries differ in their union status levels when compared against 
those from other home countries, particularly CMEs. the hypotheses, how-
ever, are not fully confirmed. we found no significant differences between 
french or Japanese and U.S. MNCs; our findings for Japanese MNCs are 
supported by prior work (Marginson et al. 2010).
Home country yielded fairly intuitive results for double-breasting. Per-
haps most surprising was that Nordic MNCs were equally as likely to be 
 double-breasted as U.S. MNCs. this may suggest some support for our hy-
pothesis regarding institutional distance (Hypothesis 3a). Consistent with 
other findings (tüselmann et al. 2007), however, German MNCs did not ap-
pear to be seeking to exploit institutional distance in order to influence ei-
ther union status or double-breasting. further, the greater propensity for 
union status and lower double-breasting levels among U.K. MNCs than 
among their U.S. counterparts indicates that not all LMEs exert similar 
home-country effects. this reflects the differences in domestic arrange-
ments underscored by freeman et al. (2007). therefore, our findings do 
not substantially support Hypothesis 3a.
Our host-country outcomes broadly confirm that differentiating between 
LME institutional contexts is productive (Hypothesis 2). Our finding that 
union status is stronger in Canada than in Ireland is consistent with Ireland’s 
12 In order to test whether double-breasting simply reflects the number of sites in a subsidiary (more 
sites increasing the odds of a nonunion presence), we ran a regression that, in addition to controlling for 
size, included a categorization of firm sites (for Canada this question was asked only of sites with more 
than 10 employees). Although the number of sites positively affected double-breasting, the results for the 
other variables remained similar to those reported in table 3 (sector effects were slightly diminished, and 
large size moved from modestly significant to nonsignificant, though this is likely an effect of collinear-
ity). As such, our results are robust irrespective of a firm’s number of sites. this regression is available on 
request.
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greater exposure to fDI—by U.S.-based MNCs in particular (Hypothesis 
3b)—and with the protection that Canada’s legally based arrangements af-
ford to union certification. But the finding that union status is least com-
mon in the United Kingdom is at odds with our reasoning on economic 
dominance. this suggests that the effect of Canada’s legally based arrange-
ments counteracts any influence of economic dominance, while the effect 
of the United Kingdom’s recent statutory procedures does not. In contrast 
to Canada’s highly decentralized bargaining arrangements, the existence of 
multisite bargaining within U.K. (and Irish) subsidiaries appears to have lit-
tle effect on union status but may protect against double-breasting. Our 
findings confirm that double-breasting is most common in Canada, and this 
conclusion aligns with our institutional reasoning about the impact of split 
jurisdictions in a federal system.
Regarding our micro-level or organizational variables, our results con-
firm the importance of sector effects (Hypothesis 4) and of product diver-
sity (Hypothesis 5). But our findings on the impact of subsidiary integration 
into the international operations of the parent company (Hypothesis 7) are 
mixed: Supplying to other sites within the MNC, or upstream integration, 
was significant for double-breasting but not for union status, possibly trans-
lating cost pressures. Downstream integration (i.e., being supplied by other 
sites in the MNC) was not significant.
Our results strongly support the contention that higher levels of subsid-
iary discretion positively influence union status (Hypothesis 6). the same 
effect does not appear to be at play in the case of double-breasting, a result 
we did not predict, and this finding is noteworthy. Its implications are that 
enhanced discretion for subsidiary managers is favorable to union status 
and that intervention in subsidiary policy by parent company management 
may work against local conventions, which, in the absence of tighter central-
ized control, would favor union status. Aligning with ferner et al.’s work 
(2001, 2005) and broader arguments about subsidiary managers seeking to 
manage conflicting pressures from corporate and local environments (Mor-
gan 2011), our findings indicate that policy discretion interacts with factors 
specific to each political economy, even after we account for home-country 
influences.
Influences on Union Status within Host Contexts
Our results provide support for our prediction that there are indeed host 
differences that affect union status within MNC subsidiaries. Nevertheless, 
the question remains: to what extent do predictors of union status vary 
within each host environment?13 to answer this question, we created subsets 
where, in each host context, we analyzed the determinants of union status 
13 we did not conduct a host subset analysis of double-breasting because of the low number of host-
country effects measured, the context-dependent definitions of the term, and methodological concerns 
over sample size.
ILR66-3_Journal.indb   713 05/02/2013   11:06:15 AM
714 ILRREVIEw
in each individual host country. Our logistic regressions in these analyses 
mirror, for the most part, our earlier regressions. the final model outcomes 
for each subset are reported in table 4.14
the Canadian subset regression fits the data well and passes all requisite 
tests. In terms of home country, we found no significant difference in union 
status for MNCs originating in continental Europe or Other Anglo-American 
countries when compared with the U.S. reference point.15 we did find, how-
ever, a significant sectoral difference: Union status was more likely to exist 
among production firms than among service firms by a factor of 5.884 
(p < .01). Subsidiaries producing a single product were more likely by a fac-
tor of 6.262 (p < .05) to recognize unions than subsidiaries offering a variety 
of products, and subsidiaries with full discretion were also more likely, by a 
Table 4. Logistic Regressions for Union Status in Host-Country Subsets
Variable
CANADA IRELAND United Kingdom
B (S.E.) Odds Ratio B (S.E.) Odds Ratio B (S.E.) Odds Ratio
Home — *** — —
Continental Europe  –.081 (.765)  .922 –1.325*** (.475)  3.763 – .576* (.346) 1.779
Other Anglo-American  –.367 (1.070)  .693 –1.772*** (.566)  5.884 – .481 (.666) 1.618
Sector *** — *** — *** —
Production –1.772*** (.664) 5.884 –2.332*** (.445) 10.293 –1.811*** (.376) 6.116
Size — ** — *** —
500–999 –1.109 (.866) 3.031  –.200 (.514)   .819 – .793* (.467) 2.211
1,000+ –1.012 (.625) 2.751 –1.115** (.465)  3.049 –1.441*** (.365) 4.225
Diversification * — — ** —
Single product –1.835** (.754) 6.262 – .064 (.483)  1.066  –.179 (.448)  .836
One dominant product – .274 (.711) 1.315 – .105 (.481)  1.111 –1.017** (.426) 2.765
Discretion ** — ** — ** —
full –1.854** (.763) 6.385 – .801** (.396)  2.228  –.703** (.351) 2.019
Upstream Integration — — —
yes  –.725 (.598)  .484  –.493 (.472)   .611  –.024 (.371)  .976
Downstream Integration — — —
yes  –.396 (.664)  .673 – .369 (.428)  1.446 – .176 (.433) 1.193
CONStANt –1.212 (.932)  .298 –2.261*** (.679)   .104 –2.909*** (.585)  .055
N 87 — 174 — 223 —
Model χ2 23.4*** — 58.6*** — 57.7*** —
Nagelkerke R 2 .328 — .384 — .304 —
–2 Log Likelihood 87.3 — 178.7 — 250.4 —
Notes: Dependent variable: Is a union (or unions) recognized/certified for the purposes of collective bargaining? 
(0 = no; 1 = yes).
for each block of variables, asterisks above the block indicate the overall significance level.
Significance levels: *** = .01 level; ** = .05 level; * = .10 level.
14 the only variable we could not duplicate was home country. In the Canadian and Irish cases, the n 
values were too small when we partitioned the sample into eight unique home categories. to overcome 
this, we collapsed the variable into three broad classifications. for the U.K. subset, we used the collapsed 
variable but also ran a separate regression that included seven home countries (see footnote 16).
15 the Other Anglo-American category includes subsidiaries from Australia, Canada, Ireland, South 
Africa, and the United Kingdom In each subset, MNCs from the particular host country were excluded. 
Japanese and Rest of world firms were also excluded from the analysis (except in the additional U.K. 
tests discussed in footnote 16).
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factor of 6.385 (p < .05), to have unions than those with less than full discre-
tion. the production network variables were not significant.
for Ireland, home country was a highly significant predictor of our de-
pendent variable. Union status was more likely, by a factor of 3.763, to exist 
at MNCs originating in continental Europe than those from the United 
States and also more likely, by a factor of 5.884, among firms from Other 
Anglo-American countries (p < .01 for both). Sector also influenced union 
status, with production firms substantially more likely to recognize unions 
than service firms (p < .01). Large subsidiaries were more likely to have 
unions, by a factor of 3.049, than small subsidiaries (p < .05). there was no 
product diversification effect in Ireland. But discretion was significant: Sub-
sidiaries that have full discretion were more likely, by a factor of 2.228 
(p < .05), to recognize unions than subsidiaries with less than full discretion. 
Again, the production network variables were not significant.
within our U.K. host subset, the broader classification of home country 
was only just significant, with continental European MNCs more likely, by a 
factor of 1.779, to have unions than U.S.-based MNCs (p < .10).16 firms op-
erating in the production sector were more likely, by a factor of 6.116, to 
have unions than those within the services sector (p < .01). Union status was 
more likely at large (p < .01) and medium-sized (p < .10) subsidiaries than at 
small ones. Subsidiaries having a dominant product were more likely, by a 
factor of 2.765 (p < .05), to have unions than those with a variety of prod-
ucts. finally, although the production network variables were not signifi-
cant, subsidiaries with full discretion were more likely, by a factor of 2.019 
(p < .05), to have unions.
Discussion of Host Subset Results
two factors cut across the three national contexts in the host analyses. the 
first is sector, where production is consistently associated with increased 
odds of union status. the second is subsidiary policy discretion, which also 
translates into a greater likelihood of union status in each national context. 
this is an important finding because it highlights the filtering or interpreta-
tive role potentially played by subsidiary managers. further, the country-
specific analyses point to the importance of host-country institutional 
effects. In particular, they emphasize the different ways national contexts, 
economic dominance, and organizational structures, policies, and strategies 
influence union status in each of the three national settings.
Ireland presents the most compelling case in terms of U.S. fDI effects on 
union status. Our findings underscore those of other studies showing U.S. 
MNCs to have lower relative levels of unionization (Gunnigle et al. 2001). 
Intriguingly, such substantial U.S. MNC home-country effects are observed 
only in Ireland, where economic dominance through fDI is strongest 
16 when we ran a regression that included seven home-country categories, we found that union status 
was more likely in German MNCs than the U.S. base (p < .05). this regression is available on request.
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(Proposition 1). the institutional latitude for union avoidance on the part 
of U.S. subsidiaries in Ireland is likely further facilitated by its more volun-
tary and permissive IR system. Union status effects, however, are not entirely 
system-dependent because several organizational characteristics remain in-
fluential, regardless of institutional permissiveness.
In contrast, our findings for Canada, where we also anticipated economic 
dominance effects to be expressed through U.S. home-country influences, 
do not support this contention (Proposition 2). the institutional latitude 
for union avoidance seems to be constrained by the legal framework under-
pinning union status (Proposition 3). Micro-level variations exercise a more 
prominent influence. the findings for subsidiary discretion are particularly 
strong and potentially highlight the importance of subsidiary managers, 
both in navigating the multiple jurisdictional requirements of the decen-
tralized federalist labor relations regime and in interpreting the more sub-
stantial legal affirmation of the right to unionize in Canada.
In the United Kingdom, although we found a positive union status effect 
among continental European, particularly German, MNCs (see footnote 
16), the preference of U.S. MNCs for lower levels of formal union status 
might have been expected to show through more strongly because the IR 
system continues to be largely voluntary. the U.K. results, therefore, suggest 
comparatively less U.S. MNC home-country effect than the results for its 
smaller and more internationally exposed Irish neighbor. As with Canada, 
union status is determined more by organizational characteristics and poli-
cies than home-country practices.
table 5. Means, Standard Deviation (SD), and Correlations for Independent Variables
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
 1 Home country: United States 0.5 0.5 1.00*
 2 Home country: france 0.07 0.25 –0.27* 1
 3 Home country: Germany 0.07 0.25 –.27* –0.07 1*.00
 4 Home country: United Kingdom 0.08 0.27 –.29* –0.08 –0.08* 1*.00
 5 Home country: Japan 0.06 0.23 –.25* –0.07 –0.07* –0.07* 1*.00
 6 Home country: Nordic 0.05 0.23 –.24* –0.06 –0.06* –0.07* –0.06* 1*.00
 7 Home country: Rest of Europe 0.12 0.33 –.37* –.10* –.10* –.11* –.09* –.09* 1*.00
 8 Home country: Rest of world 0.05 0.23 –.24* –0.06 –0.06* –0.07* –0.06* –0.06* –09* 1.00
 9 Host country: United Kingdom 0.48 0.5 –0.04* .10* 0*.00 –.28* .11* .11* 0.03* 0.05 1*.00
10 Host country: Canada 0.18 0.38 .14* –0.01 –0.07* 0.03* –0.01* –.09* –.09* –0.05 –.45* 1*.00
11 Host country: Ireland 0.34 0.48 –0.07* –.10* 0.06* .27* –.13* –0.05* 0.04* –0.01 –.69* –.34* 1*.00
12 Sector 0.59 0.49 .10* –0.04 –0.02* –.09* –0.01* 0.03* –0.04* –0.03 0.01* .11* –.10* 1*.00
13 Size: 100 to 499 0.52 0.5 –0.07* –0.07 0.09* –0.01* 0.02* 0.02* 0.08* –0.03 –0.06* –0.01* 0.06* 0.04* 1*.00
14 Size: 500 to 999 0.16 0.37 0.02* –.10* –0.01* –0.03* 0.05* –0.03* 0.03* 0.06 –0.01* 0.01* 0*.00 0.01* –.45* 1*.00
15 Size: 1,000+ 0.32 0.47 0.06* .15* –.09* 0.03* –0.06* 0*.00 –.10* –0.02 0.08* –0.02* –0.07* –0.05* –.72* –.30* 1*.00
16 Single product 0.21 0.4 –0.05* –0.02 –0.01* 0.01* 0*.00 –0.06* 0.08* 0.07 –8*.00 0.05* 0.04* 0*.00 .20* –0.05* –.18* 1*.00
17 One dominant product 0.19 0.4 –0.01* –0.03 0*.00 0.04* 0.03* 0.08* –0.02* –0.07 –0.02* 0.02* 0*.00 –0.08* –0.05* 0.01* 0.04* –.25* 1*.00
18 Variety of products 0.6 0.49 0.04* 0.05 0*.00 –0.04* –0.02* –0.02* –0.05* 0.00 0.08* –0.06* –0.04* 0.06* –.13* 0.03* .11* –.63* –.60* 1*.00
19 Discretion 0.57 0.5 –.30* 0.06 0.05* 0.07* 0.03* .17* .17* 0.00 .22* –.21* –0.06* –0.03* 0.04* –0.01* –0.03* –0.03* 0.07* –0.03* –1.00
20 Supplies to other sites 0.64 0.48 .20* –0.09 –0.02* –.20* 0.03* 0*.00 –0.05* –0.05 –0.04* –0.02* 0.05* .26* 0.03* 0*.00 –0.04* –0.07* –0.04* .09* –0.07 1
21 Supplied by other sites 0.75 0.43 –0.03* –0.04 0.01* 0*.00 .10* 0.06* –0.06* 0.02 0.08* 0*.00 –0.09* .17* 0.05* 0*.00 –0.06* –.14* 0.01* .11* –0.08 1.27* 1
*Statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
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Conclusions
Several important conclusions emerge from our analysis. the MNC subsid-
iaries investigated in these three LMEs—Canada, Ireland, and the United 
Kingdom—are in many respects quite similar. Although union presence is a 
minority phenomenon in the private sector in each country, MNCs stand 
out as frequently having formal union status in some part of their subsidiary 
operations. that said, there is also considerable within-system variation 
among these LMEs. Our examination of that variation in union status and 
double-breasting confirms our two major contentions. first, as revealed by 
the cross-national outcomes of the three host contexts, multiple strands of 
analysis are necessary to take account of the determination of IR practices 
in the foreign operations of MNCs. Second, these different sources of influ-
ence appear to vary in relation to the particularities of institutional context 
and their respective political economies, but also to converge in ways that 
cut across the three national contexts.
Our study highlights the importance of both institutional (macro) and 
organizational (micro) effects in understanding union status and double-
breasting at MNC subsidiaries. Institutional effects appear to come as much 
from the host country as from the MNC’s country of origin. Organizational 
effects are manifested by the classic size and sector determinants, product 
diversity, and the extent of local discretion over employment relations 
 policy. Local discretion is of particular importance because it highlights 
the potential importance of a subsidiary manager’s decisions in balancing 
table 5. Means, Standard Deviation (SD), and Correlations for Independent Variables
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
 1 Home country: United States 0.5 0.5 1.00*
 2 Home country: france 0.07 0.25 –0.27* 1
 3 Home country: Germany 0.07 0.25 –.27* –0.07 1*.00
 4 Home country: United Kingdom 0.08 0.27 –.29* –0.08 –0.08* 1*.00
 5 Home country: Japan 0.06 0.23 –.25* –0.07 –0.07* –0.07* 1*.00
 6 Home country: Nordic 0.05 0.23 –.24* –0.06 –0.06* –0.07* –0.06* 1*.00
 7 Home country: Rest of Europe 0.12 0.33 –.37* –.10* –.10* –.11* –.09* –.09* 1*.00
 8 Home country: Rest of world 0.05 0.23 –.24* –0.06 –0.06* –0.07* –0.06* –0.06* –09* 1.00
 9 Host country: United Kingdom 0.48 0.5 –0.04* .10* 0*.00 –.28* .11* .11* 0.03* 0.05 1*.00
10 Host country: Canada 0.18 0.38 .14* –0.01 –0.07* 0.03* –0.01* –.09* –.09* –0.05 –.45* 1*.00
11 Host country: Ireland 0.34 0.48 –0.07* –.10* 0.06* .27* –.13* –0.05* 0.04* –0.01 –.69* –.34* 1*.00
12 Sector 0.59 0.49 .10* –0.04 –0.02* –.09* –0.01* 0.03* –0.04* –0.03 0.01* .11* –.10* 1*.00
13 Size: 100 to 499 0.52 0.5 –0.07* –0.07 0.09* –0.01* 0.02* 0.02* 0.08* –0.03 –0.06* –0.01* 0.06* 0.04* 1*.00
14 Size: 500 to 999 0.16 0.37 0.02* –.10* –0.01* –0.03* 0.05* –0.03* 0.03* 0.06 –0.01* 0.01* 0*.00 0.01* –.45* 1*.00
15 Size: 1,000+ 0.32 0.47 0.06* .15* –.09* 0.03* –0.06* 0*.00 –.10* –0.02 0.08* –0.02* –0.07* –0.05* –.72* –.30* 1*.00
16 Single product 0.21 0.4 –0.05* –0.02 –0.01* 0.01* 0*.00 –0.06* 0.08* 0.07 –8*.00 0.05* 0.04* 0*.00 .20* –0.05* –.18* 1*.00
17 One dominant product 0.19 0.4 –0.01* –0.03 0*.00 0.04* 0.03* 0.08* –0.02* –0.07 –0.02* 0.02* 0*.00 –0.08* –0.05* 0.01* 0.04* –.25* 1*.00
18 Variety of products 0.6 0.49 0.04* 0.05 0*.00 –0.04* –0.02* –0.02* –0.05* 0.00 0.08* –0.06* –0.04* 0.06* –.13* 0.03* .11* –.63* –.60* 1*.00
19 Discretion 0.57 0.5 –.30* 0.06 0.05* 0.07* 0.03* .17* .17* 0.00 .22* –.21* –0.06* –0.03* 0.04* –0.01* –0.03* –0.03* 0.07* –0.03* –1.00
20 Supplies to other sites 0.64 0.48 .20* –0.09 –0.02* –.20* 0.03* 0*.00 –0.05* –0.05 –0.04* –0.02* 0.05* .26* 0.03* 0*.00 –0.04* –0.07* –0.04* .09* –0.07 1
21 Supplied by other sites 0.75 0.43 –0.03* –0.04 0.01* 0*.00 .10* 0.06* –0.06* 0.02 0.08* 0*.00 –0.09* .17* 0.05* 0*.00 –0.06* –.14* 0.01* .11* –0.08 1.27* 1
*Statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
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conflicting pressures from MNC headquarters and local institutional prac-
tices.
Our analysis is unique in its ability to account for variation in institutional 
latitude among ostensibly similar types of economies. the apparent ten-
dency of the Irish IR system to encourage home-country effects in the be-
havior of MNCs’ Irish subsidiaries is particularly striking. In contrast, Canada 
does not demonstrate similar latitude for such practices. In these envi-
ronments union status at subsidiaries is heavily influenced by organization- 
specific factors, and possibly this highlights the constraining effects of 
 Canada’s legally based unionization status regime and, of course, the social 
norms underlying that regime.
Our findings are not without limitations, and these point to the need for 
further research into the determinants of union status within MNC subsid-
iaries. first, while our unit of analysis offers a unique perspective on the be-
havior of a subsidiary as a whole it does not shed light on the means through 
which union status is achieved or, more specifically, on the precise extent 
and nature of employer opposition to organizing drives at site level. Second, 
our study captures only a single moment in time, and in-depth longitudinal 
case studies of a single firm or set of firms that involve participation by mul-
tiple IR actors at different levels, including both headquarters and subsid-
iaries, would yield a more comprehensive understanding of specific firm 
practices over time.17 third, we include a relatively limited account of sector 
effects (only production versus service), and future work might more clearly 
distinguish particular industry effects. fourth, in our sample the vast major-
ity of MNCs are headquartered in the most developed economies, and we 
are unable to provide a strong account of union status at MNCs originating 
in emerging economies. In light of the growing importance of emerging-
economy MNCs, future studies might usefully examine in such companies 
the same combination of institutional (macro) and organizational (micro) 
influences used here. finally, there may also be factors beyond our data set 
that influence our dependent variables, notably particular nuances within 
each host IR system that might impact our analysis of both the entire sample 
and the host subsets.
these considerations notwithstanding, our results make important contri-
butions to larger debates about MNC behavior. In particular, they reinforce 
the contention that because multiple determinants are at work, researchers 
need to move away from oversimplifications of types of economies in order 
to embrace the complex interface between macroinstitutional and micro-
organizational effects. A robust analysis of union status and double-breasting 
determinants within liberal market economies must include an awareness of 
differences in host economies and systems. It must incorporate a nuanced 
consideration of home-country practices and an understanding of various 
17 See, for example, Almond et al.’s (2005) work on HR/IR in one large U.S. information technology 
company with operations in four European countries or Almond and ferner’s (2006) study of IR at U.S. 
MNCs in Europe.
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organizational structures and policies and the ways they are contested by 
various actors in the management of MNC subsidiaries.
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